ABSTRACT The information-centric Internet of things (IC-IoT) is different from the traditional Internet of things (IoT) in that the device-to-device pattern is generalized to a device-to-network pattern. Furthermore, in an IC-IoT environment, there is a demand for protecting the security of all data generated from IC-IoT devices. A cryptography scheme named attribute-based encryption (ABE) represents a smart method of providing the fine-grained access control that can sufficiently protect data security. The most attractive advantage of ABE is its expressive access policy, which makes the access control of data flexible and manageable. However, there is a serious problem caused by such an access policy; it incurs a greater ciphertext redundancy and computational overhead. This implies that the current ABE scheme is hard to implement in the thin client devices of IC-IoT. In this paper, we propose a universalized policy-compacting method via sharing public parts of the policy. Compared with the original policy, the compacted policy applies a more compact ciphertext and requires less computation, communication, and storage cost. However, the policy-compacting problem is proved to be a non-deterministic polynomial complete (NPC) problem. Thus, a greedy algorithm is provided to obtain an approximate minimum compacted policy scale. Finally, we propose a compact ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CCP-ABE) scheme with the policycompacting method. A security proof and performance evaluation show that the proposed CCP-ABE scheme provides a comprehensive performance improvement.
Fortunately, attribute-based encryption (ABE), as a security cryptosystem, can provide fine-grained ciphertext access control for IC-IoT. Different from other kinds of cryptography, such as symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, ABE supports a one-to-many encryption pattern. This implies that a ciphertext of ABE can be decrypted by a set of different secret keys, which improves the scalability and flexibility of ABE. In brief, the core properties of an ABE ciphertext access control mechanism are: (1) the access control of data is maintained by a data owner (i.e., a device of the IC-IoT) instead of the storage service provider (i.e., another device of the IC-IoT); (2) the access privilege of users (i.e., all devices of IC-IoT) is described by an access policy, which is more intuitive and readable; and (3) the security property of ABE is derived from cryptography. Therefore, the ABE ciphertext access control mechanism provides several attractive advantages over other access control mechanisms, and it is more suitable for IC-IoT.
The most attractive advantage of ABE is its flexible and expressive access policy, which is used to describe finegrained data access privilege. Furthermore, the access policy can be managed in a scalable way [33] . However, the complex policy also incurs large ciphertext redundancy. This implies that the large-scale ciphertext of ABE always results in a large overhead: (1) a large computational overhead during encryption and decryption; (2) a high communication overhead during ciphertext uploading and downloading; and (3) a massive storage overhead. As is well known, in IC-IoT, there are a lot of thin client devices with limited resources, and the overhead of ABE is too heavy for these devices. Thus, an effective way of reducing ciphertext redundancy is necessary to improve the existing ABE scheme.
The most significant challenge of low-overhead ABE research is reducing ciphertext redundancy without sacrificing additional performance. In order to reduce ciphertext redundancy, Herranz et al. [17] and Chen et al. [18] proposed constant ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) schemes, but these schemes were only provided with an expressionlimited policy (i.e., AND gate access structure or a threshold function). In order to reduce the computation of client cost by large-scale ciphertext, Hohenberger and Waters [25] and Lai et al. [26] provided outsourced computation ABE schemes. In these schemes, most of the computation of encryption or decryption is outsourced to the service providers of the network. Thus, such schemes have a high communication overhead. In order to reduce the policy scale, Zhou and Huang [28] and Song et al. [29] provided a minimum sum of product expression (minimum SOPE) and minimum linear code, respectively, to minimize the policy scale. However, although a small-scale policy has less ciphertext redundancy, the reduction of redundancy is limited and unstable. Thus, it is hard to propose an ideal method to reduce the ciphertext redundancy of ABE without sacrificing performance.
In this work, we propose a compact ciphertext-policy ABE (CCP-ABE) scheme to compact the policy scale and reduce ciphertext redundancy. As is well known, there are two kinds of ciphertexts in the CP-ABE scheme: data ciphertext and attribute ciphertext, which are associated with data and attributes, respectively. Furthermore, the number of attribute ciphertexts increases with the scale of the access policy. Thus, policy-compacting, which decreases the policy scale, is an effective way to reduce ciphertext redundancy. In our proposed CCP-ABE, all attribute ciphertexts are divided into two categories: public and private attribute ciphertext units. Different from the private unit, the public unit is shared by multiple parties of the access policy. This implies that multiple private units can be merged as one public unit, and the multiple policy parties associated with the same public unit can be compacted as one. As a result, ciphertext redundancy is reduced by merging ciphertext and compacting policy. Although a cross-utilization public unit could trigger a risk of data leak, our CCP-ABE scheme provides effective protection to avoid such a risk, with only little additional storage overhead.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
(1) We propose a CCP-ABE scheme to reduce the ciphertext redundancy by sharing public parties of the access policy and public attribute ciphertext units.
(2) Two metrics, the flexible factor and overlap factor, are provided to evaluate the policy-compacting efficiency and compact ratio. Thus, the reduction of ciphertext redundancy is more intuitional and measurable.
(3) The policy-compacting problem is proven to be an non-deterministic polynomial complete (NPC) problem, and thus, a greedy compacting algorithm is provided to obtain the approximate minimum compact-policy and ciphertext scales.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the related work. Then, we propose the policy compacting method in Section III and present the CCP-ABE scheme in Section IV, respectively. Thirdly, we analyse the performance of the proposed compacted policy and CCP-ABE scheme in Section V. Finally, the conclusions is given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Substantial changes have occurred in information technology (IT), which have also brought various challenges to information security [9] [10] [11] . For instance, IC-IoT provides a novel data sharing method which is different from traditional IoT. However, data security and privacy become critical issues that restrict IC-IoT development [12] , [13] . This is because, in the open access environment, it is hard for the data owner to prevent sensitive data leakage, which incurs a serious security risk to IC-IoT [14] [15] [16] .
An access control mechanism provides an efficient way to protect the data security of IC-IoT. Significantly, scalability and flexibility are two important properties for an IC-IoT data access control mechanism [6] . In the traditional access control mechanism, there is a central organization responsible for managing data access privilege [6] [7] [8] . This implies that such mechanisms are always restricted in scalability. Fortunately, ABE provides a novel data access control mechanism, where its security depends on cryptography instead of a central privileged organization. Thus, its scalability is effectively improved. Furthermore, ABE provides a novel one-to-many encrypting pattern, which is different from other cryptographies [19] . It is well-suited for the device-to-network pattern in the IC-IoT network. Specifically, ABE can provide a finedgrained ciphertext access control mechanism for IC-IoT by using an expressive access policy. Such an access policy results in high flexibility of the ABE access control mechanism. Furthermore, in a CP-ABE scheme, the access privilege of data is described by an access policy which is derived from a secret sharing scheme [34] . A wide range of studies have been conducted to design secret sharing schemes, such as the schemes proposed in references [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] The access policy is often expressed in various forms, such as the monotonic Boolean formula, an access tree, or a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS). In brief, the access policy of ABE is diverse, which makes the ABE access control mechanism more scalable and flexible [33] .
However, the access policy incurs larger costs of computation, communication, and storage, which limits its commercial applications [30] [31] [32] . Thus, many researchers focus on the low-cost ABE schemes and low-cost applications of ABE [20] [21] [22] . As shown in Table 1 , there are three ways to achieve low-cost ABE schemes, as recently reported: constant-ciphertext setting, computation outsourcing, and policy minimizing. In a constant-ciphertext ABE scheme [23] , [24] , the access policy is expressed as an AND gate or a threshold function. Although this simple access policy reduces the resource costs of clients, it is also limited at the expression. In order to reduce client computation cost, some ABE schemes provide outsourcing of the decrypting function [25] [26] [27] . Although the computation cost of the client is reduced, the communication overhead is increased. The other efficient way to reduce resources of the ABE scheme is by minimizing the access policy. Minimal sumof-product expression (minimum SOPE) [28] and minimum linear code [29] schemes are provided to minimize policy size without breaking policy logic. This implies that the system overhead and policy performance of these schemes are all optimized. It seems that minimum policy ABE is optimal, as the system overheads are all reduced and the access policy is strong at expression. However, the performance of minimum policy ABE is limited and unstable.
Considering the insufficiencies of the above low-cost ABE schemes, we propose CCP-ABE, which has the advantage of comprehensive performance. It provides an efficient and stable way to reduce the ciphertext redundancy of ABE without any additional restrictions or costs. Furthermore, the policycompacting method can also be universally used to reduce the overhead of various existing ABE schemes.
III. COMPACTED POLICY FOR CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
ABE can be viewed as a tuple {E M , E A , A, Share}, where E M and E A are encryption algorithms, A denotes the attribute set, and Share is a secret sharing scheme (SSS). In most CP-ABE schemes, plaintext M is encrypted with a random secret s as C 0 = E M (M , s). Then, s is divided into a set of shares S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n } by Share. Finally, each share is encrypted with an attribute public key (PK) as
where ρ denotes a map from the labels {1, 2, . . . , n} to A, and PK ρ(i) denotes the PK of ρ(i) ∈ A. Thus, the whole ciphertext is expressed as CT = {C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C n }. Significantly, the size of CT is linearly increased with the size of S.
Assume that a data owner encrypts a set of data and generates multiple attribute ciphertext units associated with the same attribute. If these units are also assigned with the same share, they can be compacted as one unit, which is called the public attribute ciphertext in this work. In this vein, we present a method to compact the share set and reduce the ciphertext redundancy of ABE.
A. ACCESS POLICY
The access policy, also called the access structure, is a core concept of ABE. The formal definition of the access structure is given as follows.
Definition 1 (Access Structure [19] ): Let {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } be a set of parties. 1 An access structure is a collection A of non-empty subsets of {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n }. The sets in A are called the authorized set, and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets. Furthermore, an access structure A is monotonic if ∀B, C:
There are three common access policy forms: access tree, LSSS matrix, and monotonous Boolean expression [33] . For simplicity, we only discuss the access tree in this work. An access tree is special kind of tree structure. Let T be an access tree. Each non-leaf node n of T is a t n -out-of-n n node (i.e., threshold), where n n denotes the number of its children, t n denotes its threshold, and 0 ≤ t n ≤ n n . Each leaf n of T is described by an attribute ρ(n) and the threshold t n = 1. Then, according to Shamir's secret sharing scheme [35] , each node n is assigned with a node polynomial f n (x), such that:
where s denotes the secret, p denotes the parent of n, x n denotes the interpolation of n, and d n denotes the degree of f n (x). Finally, s n = f n (0) is called the node share of n. Furthermore, the secret s (i.e., node share of the root of T ) can be reconstructed by an authorized attribute set A. The reconstruction is processed recursively as follows. If n is a leaf, s n can be reconstructed if and only if ρ(n) ∈ A. Otherwise, n is a non-leaf, and the reconstruction of s n is successful if and only if at least t n node shares of its children are successfully reconstructed. Let N n be a t n -sized child set of n, where all c i ∈ N n have successfully been reconstructed with node share s c i . The share of n can be calculated as follows:
where f n (i) = s c i , X n = {i|c i ∈ N n }, and i,X n (x) is called the Lagrange coefficient. The correctness proof is shown as follows:
B. POLICY-COMPACTING PROBLEM
As is well known, a leaf of an access policy can be describe by a attribute and a share. Thus, multiple leaves can be compacted to one when such leaves are assigned with the same attribute and share. Figure 1 shows two examples of policy compacting. Multiple ordinary leaves of access trees can be compacted as one public leaf. In the single policy case, there are two leaves assigned with the attribute a 2 . The two leaves can be compacted as one public leaf when s 3 equals s 2 . Similarly, in the multi-policy case, four leaves of two policies can be compacted as two public leaves when s 2 = s 4 and s 3 = s 5 . Furthermore, the scale of ABE ciphertexts is dependent on the number of leaf nodes. This implies that the multiple private attribute ciphertext units associated with the ordinary leaves can also be compacted as one public attribute ciphertext unit associated with the public leaf. Thus, the ciphertext scale can be effectively reduced by using the compacted access policies and the public ciphertext units. However, there may be a risk of information leaking incurred by public ciphertext units. Suppose that an owner uploads his data M 1 and M 2 , as shown in Figure 2 . Let s 1 and s 2 be the secrets of M 1 and M 2 , respectively; T 1 and T 2 are the access trees assigned to M 1 and M 2 , respectively; and a user gets the attribute set S u = {a 1 , a 2 , a 4 }. It is clear that the user is not allowed to access M 2 , because S u is an unauthorized set of T 2 . However, in this case, the user can illegally access M 2 as follows. First, they recover shares s * 1 , s * 2 , and s * 4 via S u . Then, they calculate:
Finally,
As a result, they can successfully recover M 2 via the unauthorized S u . In order to prevent the information from leaking, the interpolations x 3 and x 4 of public unit C * a 3 must be encoded by the associated attribute a 3 . Thus, the user cannot get x 3 and x 4 unless the attribute a 3 ∈ S u . Furthermore, s * 3 cannot be calculated by Equation (6), s 2 cannot be recovered by Equation (7), and M 2 cannot be illegally accessed.
The other challenge of policy compacting is constructing the optimal compacted policies, which correspond to the minimum ciphertext scale. The formal definition of the optimal policy-compacting problem is given as follows: Input: T , k , where T is an access policy set, and k ∈ Z + . Question: Does T have a valid share set S with size k?
Claim 1: The problem is non-deterministic polynomial (NP) hard.
Proof: Let π be a function that assigns node shares for the access tree, L be a set, and element a, s ∈ L be described by an attribute a and a share s. The following verifier of the problem runs in polynomial time of |L|:
The verifier output is true if and only if all the following conditions are true:
• |L| ≤ k • ∀n ∈ T and T ∈ T , π (n) must be calculated efficiently.
• ∀ leaf n ∈ T and T ∈ T , ρ(n), π(n) ∈ L, where ρ(n) denotes the attribute associated with n. Claim 2: 3-satisfiability(3-SAT)≤ p policy compacting.
Proof: Define a function f with input ϕ and outputs T , k , where ϕ is an instance of 3-SAT and T , k is an instance of policycompacting. We now show that f is a polynomial-time function which converts the policy-compacting problem into a 3-SAT problem.
Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } denote the literals of ϕ, and C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } denote the clauses of ϕ. To justify this claim, suppose k = 2n + 3 and A = {y 1 , z 1 , . . . , y n , z n } ∪ {ω, } is the attribute set, where y i represents x i , z i represents ¬x, and ω, denote the adding attributes.
For each c j = α ∨ β ∨ γ ∈ C, we get an access treē c j , as shown in Figure 3 . Thus, T = {c 1 , . . . ,c m }. Let F ∈ {0, 1} n denote an assignment of literal set X , and let F i denote the value of x i . If ϕ is satisfied, ∃F that makes ϕ true. We choose a, b ∈ Z at random and define a function as follows: Let f 1 (x), f 2 (x), f 3 (x), and f 4 (x) be four non-constant functions assigned as node polynomials ofc j . Then, an interpolation set S x = {x 1 , x α , x β , x γ } ∈ Z * p is chosen at random, and f 1 (x) is subject to:
. (10) Then, f 1 (x) can be constructed as follows:
Let f 2 (x) = c 2 x + s, where c 2 ∈ Z p and s = f 1 (0). There are two solutions,
The node polynomials f 3 (x) and f 4 (x) are constructed in the same manner. The node shares ofc j are chosen as shown in Figure 4 , and at most nine elements are added to L:
There must be three solutions of the equation f 1 (x) = b, otherwise the third-order polynomial function f 1 (x) degenerates to a constant function f (x) = b. Thus, the node shares shown in Figure 4 are valid if and only ifc j is true (i.e., at most two of the variables τ (α), τ (β), τ (γ ) are set to be b). Furthermore, allc j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m can be assigned node shares as shown in Figure 4 if and only if F makes ϕ true. Finally, we find:
Thus, |L| = 2n + 3 in this case. If ϕ is unsatisfied, ∀F, ∃c
If c k 2 , where α k 2 , β k 2 , γ k 2 are all true, then this implies ∀c j there is at least one false literal. Thus,F (the negation of F) is a satisfied assignment for ϕ.
Furthermore,c k 1 andc k 2 must be assigned node shares, as shown in Figure 5 . Because the third-order polynomial function f k 1 ,1 (x) has three solutions of f k 1 ,1 (x) = b at most, the share a, must be added into L. Similarly, f k 2 ,1 (x) has VOLUME 6, 2018 
, ∈ X ; ¬ * : negation of * ; ω, : adding attributes.) only three solutions of f k 2 ,1 (x) = a, and share , b must be added into L. Thus,
As a result, |C| = 2n + 4 > k when ϕ is unsatisfied. Finally, we can get the result: 3-SAT≤ p policy-compacting.
C. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
The notations used in describing CCP-ABE are given in Table 2 . There are two important metrics immediately given, which are named the flexibility factor and overlap factor. Assume that T denotes an access tree and n ∈ T is a t-out-of-n node (non-leaf), where t ≤ n. Let set N n = {c i , 0 ≤ i ≤ n}, where c i for i = 0 denotes a child of n, and c 0 denotes n. The flexibility factor is defined as follows. Definition 2 (Flexibility Factor γ n for Node n): The flexibility factor γ n denotes the total number of nodes in N n that can be assigned with random shares. The upper limit of γ n is given as follows:
Following the definition, for all subtrees T ⊂ T, the following inequality must hold:
Thus, γ n = min{γ n , |N n −N n |}, where
The detailed proof of this equation is given in Appendix A. Similarly, the overlap factor is defined as follows. Definition 3 (Overlap Factor δ T for Access Tree T): The overlap factor δ T of T denotes the total number of leaves of T that can be associated with public units. We then get:
The validity of Equation (14) is proved in Appendix B. Furthermore, the bilinear map plays a crucial role in ABE. The definition of a bilinear map is described as follows. Additionally, there are some hard problems which support the security of the ABE mechanism. We introduce one of the hard problems-the decisional q-parallel bilinear DiffieHellman exponent assumption-to guarantee the security of our CCP-ABE scheme.
Assumption 1 (Decisional q-Parallel Bilinear DiffieHellman Exponent Assumption, q-Parallel BDHE): Assume G 0 , G T are two group with prime order p, and e : G 0 × G 0 → G T is a bilinear map. Let α, b 1 , . . . , b q , s ∈ Z p be chosen at random, and let g be a generator of G 0 . If a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A is given:
then it must be hard to distinguish a valid element T 0 = e(g, g) a q+1 s ∈ G T from a random element T 1 = R ∈ G T . Assume that B is a PPT algorithm with output z ∈ {0, 1}. We say that B gets the advantage in solving q-parallel BDHE, if:
where Pr[ * ] denotes the probability of event * . The decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds if and only if there is no PPT algorithm B that gets a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing the q-parallel BDHE tuple { y, T }.
D. GREEDY POLICY-COMPACTING ALGORITHM
Before compacting access polices, we need to initialize the flexibility factor of each node via Algorithm 1. Let T be an access tree, and let r be the root of T. Init γ (r) is run as a depthfirst traversal of T and initializes the flexibility factor of all nodes of T.
Algorithm 1
//Let n be a t n -out-of-n n node and N n be the child set of n 5:
for c i ∈ N n − {n} do 7: k n ← k n + Init(c i ) 8: end for 9: if t n = 2 then 10:
else 12: γ n ← min{t n , |N n | − k n }
13:
end if 14: if γ n = |N n | − k n then Then, the algorithm Update(n) is called to update the flexibility factor of the access tree T when a node n ∈ T is assigned with node share. In this algorithm, three arrays Count, C, and S are given to describe the public attribute ciphertext. For each attribute a i , there are three related parameters count i ∈ Count, C * a i ∈ C, and s * i ∈ S. count i denotes the number of leaves n ∈ T associated with a i . C * , s * i ∈ S are all updated when a leaf n ∈ T with attribute a i is assigned with a node share s n . Finally, Update(n) is called iteratively to assign the share for n and update the flexibility factor of part of the node in T.
Suppose that T = {T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m } denotes an access tree set, and Compact(T ) is a greedy algorithm proposed for compact-policy set T. First, array Count is initialized. Then, Compact(T ) calls Init γ (r j ) for each root r j of T j ∈ T to initialize its flexibility factor. Third, each secret s j of r j is assigned, and Update γ r j is called to update the flexibility factor again. Finally, the attribute a i with max count i is chosen each time, and a share s * i is assigned for all nodes n where ρ(n) = a i and s n = null. In this step, for all leaves n, ρ(n) = a i , Update γ (n) is called to update their flexibility factors and assign their node shares.
Algorithm 2 Update γ (n)
Require: Node: n Ensure: Node share: s n Updated node flexibility factor: γ n 1: if n is a leaf then 2: if s * ρ(n) = null then 3: if s n = null then 4:
γ n ← γ n − 1 6:
Update γ (p) 8: end if 9: s * ρ(n) ← s n 10:
else 12: if s n = null then 13 :
γ n ← γ n − 1 16 :
Update γ (p) 18: else 19: assign the storage unit for C n 20:
Count ρ(n) ← Count ρ(n) − 1 22: end if 23: end if 24: else 25: if n is root and s n = null then 26: 
γ n ← γ n − 1 28: end if 29: if γ n = 0 and f n = null then 30: //Let N n be the child set of n 31: Calculate node polynomial function f n (x) 32: Assign interpolation for all c i ∈ N n 33: if s n = null then 34: s n ← f n (0) 35: γ p ← γ p − 1 36: Update γ (p) 37: end if 38: for c i ∈ N n do 39: if s c i = null then 40: s c i ← f n (s c i ) 41 :
Uptate γ (c i ) 43: end if 44: end for 45: end if 46: end if
IV. COMPACT CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME
As shown in Figure 6 , the system model of the compact ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CCP-ABE) scheme consists of four types of entities: VOLUME 6, 2018
Algorithm 3 Compact(T )
Require: Access policy set: T Ensure: Node share set: S 1: for leaf n ∈ T do 2: count ρ(n) ← count ρ(n) + 1 3: end for 4: for T i ∈ T do 5: Init γ (r i ) //r i denotes the root of T
6:
Uptate γ (r i ) 7: end for 8: while ∃a i , count a i = 0 do 9: //Let N a i be the set of leaves assigned with attribute a i
10:
while N a i = ∅ do 11: Choose a node n ∈ N a i
12:
Update γ (n) 13 :
end while 15 : end while Authority. The authority is responsible for generating the public key (PK), secret key (SK), and master key (MK). Information center. The information center can be viewed as an abstract distributed cluster of the network. It is responsible for data storage in the IC-IoT network.
Owner. An owner denotes a device of IC-IoT that generates and uploads data to the information center. Note that data uploaded to the information center are all encrypted as ciphertexts by using the PK. User. A user denotes a device that downloads ciphertext from the information center and recovers the according plaintext by its SK. Note that a user can also be an owner in this system. Furthermore, the CCP-ABE scheme includes the following four functional modules:
Setup: The authority chooses g 1 , g 2 ∈ G 0 , w, x ∈ Z p and calculates P = g x 1 and ϒ = e(g 1 , g 2 ) w , where G 0 , G T are two multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order p, and e : G 0 × G 0 → G T denotes a bilinear map. For each attribute a i ∈ A, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , a random number a i ∈ Z p is chosen and . . , M n } be a plaintext set and let T = {T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T n } denote the according access tree set. The owner calls Compact(T ) to compact access policies and assign shares. Then, the ciphertext is calculated in three steps. First, for each M j ∈ M, the data ciphertext is calculated:
where s j ∈ Z p . Second, for each private node n, the private ciphertext unit is calculated as follows:
where r n , s n ∈ Z p . Finally, for each public ciphertext C * a i , we calculate:
where
, r a i , s a i ∈ Z . Additionally, for all nodes n, φ(n) = C * a i , the node interpolation x n is encoded as
Decryption:
The user determines an authorized set U ⊂ U s of T j , where U s is their attribute set. For each private leaf node n ∈ T j , they calculate:
where ρ(n) ∈ U . For each public leaf node n ∈ T j , the user calculates:
. Then, all non-leaf nodes are processed as follows. Let n be a t-out-of-n node, let S n be a child set of n, and |S n | = t. Assume that ∀µ ∈ S n , TK µ is obtained. The user computes TK n as follows:
63520 VOLUME 6, 2018 where µ,S n (0) is the Lagrange coefficient 2 of µ. The user recovers the plaintext when TK r j of the access tree root r j is obtained:
ws r j e(g 1 , g 2 ) ws r j −xus r j e(g 1 , g 2 )
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. SECURITY PROOF
We prove that the security of our CCP-ABE scheme in the selective security model 3 reduces to the hardness of the q-parallel BDHE assumption. Suppose that there exists a polynomial-time adversary A which can attack our scheme in the selective security model with advantage . Then, we can build a simulator B which distinguishes the q-parallel BDHE tuple { y, T } with advantage . The simulation proceeds as follows.
Init: First, B gets a challenge q-parallel BDHE tuple { y, T }. Note that we only consider the simplest case of a compact access policy in this proof; the proof of other cases is similar. Thus, A can present a challenge policy set as
Let n * be the only public node of T , which only associates with the i th 1 leaf of T 1 and the i th 2 leaf of T 2 . Following the method proposed in Reference [33] , T 1 and T 2 can be equivalently expressed as two LSSS matrices denoted by (X , ρ 1 ) and (Y , ρ 2 ). Assume that X = (x i,j ) l 1 ×m 1 , Y = (y i,j ) l 2 ×m 2 , X i 1 , Y i 2 denote the rows assigned to public node n * , ρ 1 (i 1 ) = ρ 2 (i 2 ) = a * , and m 1 ≤ l 1 , m 2 ≤ l 2 . Following the definition of X and Y , there exist j 1 ∈ Z m 1 , j 2 ∈ Z m 2 where ∀i = i 1 , x i,j 1 = 0 and ∀i = i 2 , y i,j 2 = 0. For simplicity, let j 1 = j 2 = 1. Then, we define the following matrix M , and mapping function ρ * :
Setup: B chooses w , η ∈ Z p and sets x = αη,
Calculation of the Lagrange coefficient is given in Equation (4). 3 The selective security model is given in [19] .
α j m l,j /b l )/x. This implies that:
Significantly, P i = g a i if and only if S i = ∅. Phase 1: B responds to the SK queries. Assume that B is given an SK query with a set U s which does not satisfy policy (X , ρ 1 ). Then, B picks u ∈ Z p at random. Furthermore, it finds a vector = ( 
Additionally, B calculates the attribute SK D i = p xa i u = g uxa i . We consider the calculation in two case:
where:
Since the unknown term g α q+1 is canceled, we can calculate D u and D i easily.
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Challenge: B builds the challenge ciphertext. A gives two challenge messages M 0 and M 1 and an appended message M 2 to B. It creates
where γ 1 , γ 2 ∈ Z p , and υ ∈ {0, 1} are all chosen at random. Then, B chooses v 2 , . . . , v m 1 +m 2 ∈ Z p randomly and generates the vector:
For each row X l of X , B chooses r l ∈ Z p randomly, sets r l = r l − sb l η, and calculates:
Assume that ρ 1 (l) = a i . We find:
For message M 2 , B generates the following vector:
Similarly, for each row Y l of Y , B calculates:
v j m l,j , and i 2 = λ i 1 . Furthermore, B chooses t l ∈ Z p , l = i 2 at random and sets:
Thus, it can easily calculateC 2,l = g t l . Furthermore, for ∀l = i 2 , assume that ρ 2 (l) = a i . Thus:
where s a * , r a * ∈ Z p are chosen at random. The public attribute ciphertext of public node n is shown as follows:
The above components are easy to calculate because there is no unknown term g α q+1 . Additionally,
Phase 1 is repeated. Guess: A outputs a guess υ of υ. B outputs 0 to guess T = e(g, g) sα q+1 when υ = υ; otherwise, it outputs 1 to indicate that T is a random element in G T . Assume that A has the non-negligible advantage Adv A = in breaking the CCP-ABE scheme. It is clear that B gives a perfect simulation when T = e(g, g) sα q+1 . Thus, = e(g, g) sα q+1
Pr[B( y, T
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Therefore, B can play the decisional q-BDHE game with nonnegligible advantage :
As a result, B has the non-ignorable advantage in distinguishing the q-parallel BDHE tuple { y, T } when the PPT attacker A has the advantage in breaking our CCP-ABE scheme.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Scalability and flexibility are two important properties for the IC-IoT data access control mechanism. Different from the traditional access control mechanism, the ABE access control mechanism does not require that a central organization be responsible for managing data access privilege. This implies that ABE has the significant improvement of having access control mechanism scalability. Furthermore, compared with other cryptography schemes, ABE provides a novel one-tomany encrypting pattern, which provides improved flexibility of the IC-IoT data access control mechanism. In brief, the ABE ciphertext access control mechanism is more suitable for the highly pervasive and distributed IC-IoT. However, the existing ABE scheme has greater ciphertext redundancy, which incurs heavy computation, communication, and storage costs for IC-IoT devices. Thus, low-cost ABE schemes have been extensively researched in recent years. Significantly, in this respect, the proposed CCP-ABE scheme shows comprehensive performance improvement. For performance evaluation, we simulated our CCP-ABE scheme using a Linux virtual machine with 2.83 GHz CPU and 1.00 GB RAM. The result of the simulation is given as follows.
Assume that a set of data {M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M m } is given with the access tree set {T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m }. Let l i denote the number of leaves of T i , and let δ i denote the overlap factor of T i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Furthermore, assume that l i ∼ N (µ l , δ l ) and δ i ∼ N (µ T , δ T ) are independent and identically distributed. Figure 7 shows the compacted ciphertext size as a function of the number m for µ l = 20, δ l = δ T = 5, and µ T = 0, 5, 10, 15. Note that, the curve µ T = 0 approximates to the uncompacted case, it can be viewed as the reference curve. However, in this case, the ciphertext size increases with the total number of access policies m, and its increase rate depends on the expected overlap factor µ T of each data access policy.
Similarly, assume a ciphertext compacting ratio
where L is the number of leaves in the compacted access tree sets and L is the number of leaves in the uncompacted access tree sets. Figure 8 shows the compacting ratio of such a ciphertext set as a function of the number m when µ l = 20, δ l = δ T = 5, and µ T = 0, 5, 10, 15. Note that, the curve µ T = 0 approximates to the case of the uncompacted scheme, it can be viewed as the reference curve. In this case, the compacting ratio R increases quickly with m when m is small and approaches the constant µ T /µ l when m is larger than a certain threshold. Furthermore, Figure 9 shows the encryption time of such compacted ciphertexts as a function of the number m when µ l = 20, δ l = δ T = 5, and µ T = 0, 5, 10, 15. Note that, the curve µ T = 0 approximates to the case of uncompacted ABE scheme, it can be viewed as the reference curve. In this case, the encryption time linearly grows with the number of access policies, but the larger µ T incurs a lower growth rate. Figure 10 shows the corresponding decryption time of compacted ciphertexts as a function of the ciphertext number m when µ l = 20, δ l = δ T = 5, and µ T = 0, 5, 10, 15. Note that, the curve µ T = 0 approximates to the case of uncompacted ABE scheme, it can be viewed as the reference curve. Similarly, in this case, the decryption time has approximately linear growth with the number of ciphertexts, but a larger µ l incurs a lower growth rate.
In brief, as shown in the simulation, the comprehensive performance of the proposed CCP-ABE scheme has been greatly improved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to reduce ciphertext redundancy, we provide a policycompacting method for ABE. The method can reduce various overheads of the ABE scheme without sacrificing any additional performance. However, the policy-compacting problem is an NPC problem, and a greedy compacting algorithm is provided to achieve an approximate minimum ciphertext scale. The detailed security proof and performance evaluation of the scheme are also given in this work. These demonstrate that the scheme obtains comprehensive performance improvement, with its storage and computation overhead all significantly reduced.
APPENDIX A FLEXIBILITY FACTOR
Let n be a non-leaf (t n -out-of-n n node) of access tree T, p be the parent of n, γ n be the flexibility factor of n,γ n denote the upper limit of γ n , and p be a prime. Here we prove that the inequality in Equation (13) holds. First,γ n is discussed in two cases: 1) For t n = 2. This case is presented in two further subcases: t n = 1 and t n ≥ 3. If t n = 1, f n (x) must be a constant function, and it can be affirmed with only one interpolating node (x c , s c ), c ∈ N n . Thus,γ n = t n = 1. If t n ≥ 3, f n (x) is a (t n − 1)-order polynomial function. It is clear that it is highly possible that there is a non-feasible solution x ∈ Z p for f (x) ≡ s mod p, s ∈ Z p when t n ≥ 3. For feasibility and efficiency, f (x) is constructed as a Lagrange (x c i ) , where x c i is chosen at random. Thus,γ n is also equal to t n in this subcase.
2) For t n = 2. Let s c i ∈ Z p be the share of c i ∈ N , and the node polynomial can be assigned as f n (x) = ax + s n , where a ∈ Z p and s n is the share of n. However, all shares of s c i , 0 ≤ i ≤ n n do not equally guarantee that f n (x) is not degenerate. ∀c i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n n , the valid interpolation in Z p can be calculated as x i = a −1 (s c i − s n ) mod p. Thus,γ n is generally set to be |N n | when t n = 2.
Next, the inequality n∈T γ n ≤ | ∪ n∈T N n | is considered.
Let n be a non-leaf of T, h n be the height of n, and N n = {c ∈ N n |γ c ≥ |N c |}. The equation γ n = min{γ n , |N n |} can be inductively proved. If h n = 2, then N n = N n . Thus, γ n = min{γ n , |N n |} holds. Assume that γ n = min{γ n , |N n |} when h n ≤ k. Then, we prove that γ n = min{γ n , |N n |} when h n = k+1. ∀T ⊂ T, n ∈T γ n ≤ | ∪ n ∈T n N n |. This implies that:
where T n denotes that a subtree of T includes n. Thus, we select a subtree T n ⊂ T that satisfies the following conditions: 1) n is the root of T n ; and 2) ∀c ∈ N n , n ∈ T n , ifγ c ≥ |N c |, then c ∈ T n . ∀n ∈ T n −{n}, we have h n ≤ k and γ n = min{γ n , |N n |} ≥ |N n |. As a result:
Thus, γ n = min{γ n , |N n |} when h n = k + 1.
APPENDIX B OVERLAP FACTOR
Let T be an access tree, N T be the non-leaf set of T, r be the root of T, and d T describe the depth of T. Here, we prove that Equation (14) holds. Considering security, the root r of T must be assigned with a random secret. Thus, the overlap factor δ T is analyzed as follows. If k = 2, then r is the only non-leaf of T. We describe δ T in two cases: 1) s r is assigned. Thus, δ T = γ n − 1. As a result:
2) s r is unassigned. Then δ T is calculated as follows:
This implies that:
Assume Equation (14) 
